# They Called It GTO

- NL BSS
- NL BSS

(22 Głosy)
11240
## Opis

Tackleberry begins a new series looking at common myths and misconceptions about GTO. If you're unsure of how to apply GTO concepts to your game or are somewhat skeptical of GTO and would lik more information then this is the video for you

## Komentarze (24)

od najnowszych#1

#2

#3

Another misconception is that there is a unique GTO strategy. In multiplayer games like poker, the Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique, and may be exploitable by a player prepared to use a different equilibrium strategy. The dynamics of this are poorly understood by game theorists as far as I can tell. There's a bit about this somewhere in my blog, but I'm going to be publishing an article about this on the website for our book some time soon.

#4

Regarding myth #2 and the autoprofit concept, it looks like your conclusion is that we should defend wider than 33% of our opening range, but that will obviously depend on our opponent's 3bet%, which you didn't mention.

In that sense, for me the nemesis-approach is much worse than the constructive approach. I think is way better to ask ourselves how much the oppoennt is 3betting and with wich hands defending is higher Ev than folding, than just saying we have to defend x% of our range to prevent the opponent from autoprofiting.

Another confusing concept is "balance". As I understand it, balance helps us being difficult to read against decent opponents by including different hand types in our lines (at least in our most common lines). And isn't that more important in practice than trying to achieve unexploitable frequencies?

Also, I think it doesn't make much sense to balance our range with Ev- moves. For example, if 3betting as a bluff with a certain hand is Ev-, why should we 3bet with it? Couldn't we "balance" our 3betting range with Ev+ hands?

Poker is not dead...

#5

If a call's -EV it's -EV, no amount of fancy words will make that untrue

#6

#7

#8

Especially whats your stance on how pretty much everyone choose how they fill their bluff frequencies (equity+blockers) and calldown frequencies (kicker, blockers).

Blockers are fun that they create an asymmetry of information and should make GTO solutions even more complex.

And I'd love tons of practical examples :) gl.

#9

Sum of all players win/loss egal to zero.

#10

@1+2: Thanks a lot! :)

@3: Looking forward to your input.

@4: "... but that will obviously depend on our opponent's 3bet%, which you didn't mention." => That´s not correct in theory, if we couldn´t defend against Villain´s 3bet often enough, sth. with our open-range went wrong.

@4: "Also, I think it doesn't make much sense to balance our range with Ev- moves." => 100% correct, where did I suggest defending with -EV-hands? @5 nailed it.

@6: :)

@7: R can never get negative. :) Zero is the treshold ... and always keep in mind, if we have a hand with 20%, an R of 80% means, we´re taking 16% (!!) of the pot, this seems quite reasonable to me ... I mean, there´s always some bluff-potential and this is included in R!! R does not count how often we win at showdown, it counts the money going in.

@8: The first three parts (so this and the following two) will only contain theory, but the 4th part - which I´m currently working on - will contain many examples.

@9: Correct! And even if we take the blinds into account, autoprofit on later streets still counts ...

#11

let's take an extreme

A bot 3bets always bet bet shoves with air and always checks folds when he hits a flop and we know it.

his postflop expectation will be hugely negative and every time he does see a flop he bleeds money away - and the bigger the pot the more money he loses.

when postlfop R=0 for bluff hands vs a 4b fold only strategy, how come it can't be negative when every time we see a flop we lose money?

#12

Or fish that never folds postflop.

every time they see the flop, their expectation is negative

in terms of math on earlier street R seems the only variable affected by this

#13

#14

#15

Optimal defending frequencies make sense only against optimal attacking frequencies imo. But since I don't know how optimal attacking frequencies look like, isn't it better to use the constructive approach, as you named it?

Thanks for your attention and nice series!

#16

#17

Two player zero sum games are a VERY special case, and should not be our conceptual model for poker. All equilibria of a game like that have the same payoff. This is not true of ANY other type of game. Once you have more than one equilibrium (remember that an equilibrium is a local, not a global one) with different payoffs for each player, you have to consider the dynamics of the moves from one equilibrium to another. This is not something that I see addressed anywhere in any poker GTO discussion.

#18

#19

#20

Any feedback to my blog please.

http://www.pokerstrategy.com/forum/thread.php?threadid=87154

#21

#22

#23

#24